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Museums establish specific contexts, framings, which distinguish them from viewing 
the world face-to-face. One striking aspect of exhibition in so-called participatory 
museums is that it echoes and transforms the limits of its own frame as a public 
space. I argue that it is a mistake to think of the meaning of an exhibit as either 
determined by the individual viewer’s narrative or as determined by the conception 
as presented in the museum’s ‘authoritative’ narrative. Instead I deploy the concept 
of a model of comparison to illuminate the philosophical significance of perspective 




Museums are, among other things, sites for conveying meaning. This makes them 
interesting to philosophers. In particular it would be interesting to understand how, 
if at all, museums convey meaning through the objects exhibited in them. Here I 
shall not talk about the mechanics of museum display, nor say much about the 
nature of the putative educative function of the museum as such (until I draw out an 
implication at the end). My focus is rather on a methodological meta-problem about 
museums and the meaning of the objects exhibited that stems from a number of 
characteristic features of any museum’s display that we may identify as the narrative 
                                            
1 Forthcoming in A. Bergqvist, V. Harrison & G. Kemp (eds.), Philosophy and Museums: 
Ethics, Aesthetics and Ontology. Philosophy Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 
Cambridge University Press. Publication date: August 2015. © All rights reserved.  
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aspect of museum exhibits as organised intentional-communicative artefacts,2 
artefacts that have been put together in order to tell a story. 
 
Engagement with museum narratives has sometimes been characterised as a 
cognitively unmediated process in sensory items. However, new museum forms, 
especially given focus on audience participation in the wake of Hilde Hein’s work,3 
for instance, draw our attention to the constructive nature of aesthetic judgement 
such that perceived order in it is constituted, at least in part, by the ascription of 
intention.  
 
In what follows, I will assume as uncontroversial that museum exhibits can have a 
narrative communicative function by virtue of their curator’s intentions,4 manifested 
in what Ivan Gaskell calls the invariably selective process of display, the discursive 
means of their physical arrangement (even if unaccompanied by text of any kind), 
and their status as authored (even when the agent of the intention is not explicitly 
acknowledged or even clearly conceived).5 Moreover, the ascription of intention 
employs background knowledge and experience on the part of the audience or, in 
other words, implicates the perceiver’s conceptual framework to account for events. 
                                            
2 I borrow the term ‘intentional-communicative artefact’ from Gregory Currie’s Narrative 
and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 6. 
3 See, for instance, Hilde Hein, The Museum in Transition: A Philosophical Perspective 
(Smithsonian, 2000) and Hilde Hein, Public Art: Thinking museums differently (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006). 
4 For a defence of the related, but importantly different, moderate actual intentionalist claim 
that the meaning of art is a function of the communicative intentions of its author, see Noël 
Carroll, ‘Art, Intention, and Conversation’, in his Beyond Aesthetics (Cambridge: CUP, 
2001), 157–80; also see Carroll’s ‘Art Interpretation: The 2010 Richard Wollheim Memorial 
Lecture’, British Journal of Aesthetics 52/2 (2011), 117–135. For criticism of Carroll’s 
communication argument for moderate actual intentionalism, see Andrew Huddleston, ‘The 
Conversation Argument for Actual Intentionalism’, British Journal of Aesthetics 52/3 
(2012), 241–256. 
5 Ivan Gaskell, ‘Museums and Philosophy – Of Art, and Many Other Things Part II’, 
Philosophy Compass 7/ 2 (2012), 90. See also David Carrier, Museum Skepticism: A History 




This aspect of the narratives of museums, the significance of the reader’s background 
knowledge and conceptual framework, may seem incompatible with another truism, 
namely that many museums, notably art galleries, can serve to criticize prevailing 
values and norms, including conceptual schemes, and thereby be a source of novel 
insight. Drawing this conclusion would however be too hasty, and here I show how 
we can make better progress by examining the deeper underlying issue of perspective 
and point of view in museum practice in ways that connect with debates in 
contemporary philosophical aesthetics about authorial intention and the question of 
interpretation and objectivity in the arts more generally.6  
 
One central issue in recent discussions over authorial intention and interpretation of 
art (and by extension art exhibitions) centres on the idea of conversation. Thus, for 
example, Gregory Currie says of narrative art that  
 
we must see text-based works for what they are: the intentional products of 
communicative action. We have every reason to think that it is by treating 
them as such products that we do interpret them, and no idea about how else 
we might do it.7  
 
This leads many contemporary authors engaged in the debate (though not Currie) to 
the moderate actual intentionalist view that, in Robert Stecker’s words, ‘“text-based 
works” have the same sort of meaning as other linguistic utterances and reference to 
the actual intentions of a work’s creator plays an in-eliminable role in specifying 
what that meaning is’.8 If we deny, so the conversation argument goes, that an 
                                            
6 Gregory Currie, ‘Interpretation and Objectivity’, Mind 102/407 (1993), 413–428.  
7 Gregory Currie, Arts and Minds (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 132. 
8 Robert Stecker, ‘Moderate Actual Intentionalism Defended’, The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism 64/4 (2006), 429. Other prominent versions of moderate actual intentionalism 
in the contemporary debate over authorial intention include the works of Noël Carroll and 
Paisley Livingston. See, for example, Carroll, ‘Art, Intention, and Conversation’, op. cit. and 
‘Art Interpretation: The 2010 Richard Wollheim Memorial Lecture’, op. cit. For Livingston’s 
position, see, for example, his Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2005) and Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman: On Film As Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
 4 
author’s actual communicative intentions should constrain the proper interpretation 
of his or her work and instead opt for some alternative construal of our own, we are 
depriving ourselves of the chance to engage in a conversation (in some metaphorical 
sense) with this author – and thus are losing the chance (again, in some 
metaphorical sense) to commune with another human being.9 Hence, if museums’ 
exhibits can and should be understood as essentially communicative artefacts (as 
“text-based works” or in some other metaphorical sense), then understanding or 
interpreting the meaning of some exhibit would similarly seem to invite us to engage 
in conversation of some kind with its curator. Against this view, recent philosophical 
contributions to the literature on museum exhibitions often place great emphasis on 
audiences’ experiences over that of curatorial intention. Advocates of this approach 
to museums often maintain that meaning is dependent on the individual subject’s 
point of view and as such is radically pluralistic and open-ended. 
 
Here I argue that (a) questions about interpretation of museum exhibits can have 
correct answers depending on how things are, but that (b) this claim for correctness 
and objectivity does not undermine the critical pluralist intuition that it is 
appropriate to bring a multiplicity of internally incompatible perspectives to bear on 
one and the same exhibit in a way that mitigates against the idea of combining 
perspectives into a single comprehensible view – if by the relevant notion of 
‘comprehensible view’ we mean integration by simple addition.10  
                                                                                                                                       
University Press, 2009). Historically, Monroe Beardsley would be the defender of anti-
intentionalism in the movement of New Criticism, with work on the “Intentional Fallacy” 
going back to the 1940s; in continental philosophy anti-intentionalism is found in the “death 
of the author” movement in post-structuralism associated with the works of Roland Barthes; 
and E.D. Hirsch put authorial intention back on the table with literary hermeneutics in 1967. 
While advancing his own arguments, in his 2012 BSA Richard Wollheim Memorial Lecture, 
Carroll argues (rightly in my view) that Wollheim’s seminal work Painting as an Art 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987) is justly thought of as an authorial 
intentionalism (criticism as retrieval). 
9 See Huddleston, ‘The Conversation Argument for Actual Intentionalism’, op. cit. 
10 Robert Stecker sets up a related argument but draws a different conclusion. For further 
discussion of the idea of comprehensiveness, the idea of basing the claim for the objectivity 
of interpretation on what Gadamer (1975) calls the “fusion of horizons”, see Gregory Currie, 
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After clarifying some issues in recent interventions on authorial intention, I develop 
a theory about what meaning within the museum context might be, and about the 
appropriate method for meaning retrieval in the epistemology of language more 
generally. That package I call methodological particularism. Much recent argument 
for objectivity in interpretation, a view sometimes referred to as ‘critical monism’, 
insists on the claim that texts can have literal meanings that ultimately derive from 
their (implied) author’s intentions.11 Conversely, pessimism about objectivity in 
favour of indeterminacy and subjectivism in interpreting art typically depends on 
scepticism about this claim.12 In contrast to the standard versions of intentionalism 
(actual or hypothetical), the methodological particularism argument for objectivity 
abandons the commitment to authorial intentions in meaning retrieval in favour of 
an alternative non-reductive conception of linguistic meaning as open-ended to serve 
as an adequate model for meaning in museum narratives. Such reorientation of focus 
makes available a novel conception of interpretation where the emphasis on 
authorial intentions is criticized not as false per se, but as failing to yield the insight 
                                                                                                                                       
‘Interpretation and Objectivity’, op. cit. and John McDowell, ‘Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, 
and the Fabric of the World’, in E. Schaper (ed), Pleasure, Preference and Value 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). See also Adrian Moore, Points of View 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
11 I borrow the terms ‘critical monism’ and ‘critical pluralism’ from Robert Stecker’s ‘Art 
Interpretation’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52/2 (1994), 193–206. Readers 
familiar with this article will see some similarities between mu approach and Stecker’s 
moderate actual intentionalist argument for what he later calls the ‘unified view’. See Robert 
Stecker, Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1997); Robert Stecker, ‘Interpretation’, in B. Gaut and D. Lopes (eds), The 
Routledge Companion to Aesthetics (London: Routledge, 2001), 239–251; Robert Stecker, 
‘Moderate Actual Intentionalism Defended’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
64/4 (2006), 429–438. The main difference between us is the commitment to anti-
reductionism about meaning in the novel argument about authorial intentions in museum 
narratives defended here. 
12 See, for example, Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally (Durham, North Carolina: 
Duke University Press, 1989); see also Sanford Levinson, ‘Law as Literature’, in S. Levinson 
(ed), Interpreting Law and Literature (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
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about meaning it was the point of that move to make in understanding objectivity in 
interpretation. 
 
2. The Challenge from Viewer-Centred Narratives 
 
Recent philosophical contributions to the literature on museum exhibitions often 
place great emphasis on the concept of construction in museum narratives. Thus, for 
instance, in his discussion of intention in relation to artists and artworks in museum 
exhibits, Michael Baxandall claims that ‘it is not possible to exhibit objects without 
putting a construction upon them’, since exhibitions themselves embody a selective 
ordering of items involving a tri-fold structure of salient ‘cultural terms’: historical 
context, curator and viewer – each dimension laden with theory and evaluative 
outlook. He writes: 
 
First, there are the ideas, values, and purposes of the culture from which the 
object comes. Second, there are the ideas, values, and, certainly, purposes of 
the arrangers of the exhibition. These are likely to be laden with theory and 
otherwise contaminated by a concept of culture that the viewer does not 
necessarily possess or share. Third, there is the viewer himself, with all his 
own cultural baggage of unsystematic ideas, values and, yet again, highly 
specific purposes.13 
 
The emphasis placed on construction, both in the prescribed ‘authoritative’ museum 
narrative (including the ‘implied’ curator narrative, if a museum conceals that 
authorship) and the viewer’s narrative, marks a shift in our perception of the 
museum and, in particular, a changed attitude toward the role of museum-goers’ 
experience. As Hein puts it, nowadays the members of the audience are ‘viewed as 
variegated, textured beings marked by their own history and experience and by the 
                                            
13 Michael Baxandall, ‘Exhibiting Intention: Some Preconditions of the Visual Display of 
Culturally Purposeful Objects’, in Ivan Karp and Steven Laine (eds), Exhibiting Cultures: 
The Poetics and Politics of Museums Display (Smithsonian Institution, 1991), 33. See also 
Svetlana Alpers, ‘Museums as a Way of Seeing’, in the same volume.  
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constructive proclivities they brought with them into the museum’.14 On Hein’s 
model, objects in museum collections inspire new experiences through an open-
ended dialogue (in some metaphorical sense): the unified narratives of which they 
are part are fluid and collaborative, drawing on the museum, the curators and the 
visitors. The underlying conceptual model for Hein’s account of museums is that of 
public art, where the role of public artists is in turn described in terms of the process 
and the responses of the public, rather than the objects themselves. She writes: 
 
Today’s public artists incline to replace answers with questions. They seek to 
advance debate and discussion. Their art is left open-ended and invites 
participation. Its orientation is toward process and change rather than material 
stability. Since its borders are indefinite, so is its authorship.15 
 
Hein argues that all of these characteristics, and more, are to be found in new public 
art that can come to serve as a paradigm for the new museum. The new museum’s 
focus on affecting certain experiences in the visitor is typically presented as a 
challenge to the traditional model of the museum as public educator by virtue of its 
(alleged) capacity to illustrate established ideas and to demonstrate truths through 
displaying objects in its collections.16 So far so good: we can perhaps all agree that 
there has been a shift in focus in current museum practice to connect with its visitors’ 
personal interests and individual histories. The more interesting question is whether 
this development calls for a new model of meaning and objectivity in museum 
practice. If it does, we can ask: What should such a model be like?  
 
Current thinking with respect to museums and the meaning of the objects exhibited 
– especially given the fashion for focusing on visitor participation – seems to assume 
that the meaning (significance, essence, nature) of an exhibit is fixed by either of the 
following alternatives: 
 
                                            
14 Hilde Hein, Public Art: Thinking museums differently (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 7. 
15 Ibid., 76. 
16 Jonathan Neufeld, ‘Review of Hilde Hein, Public Art: Thinking Museums Differently’, 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66/1 (2008) 102–105. 
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(1) Viewer narrative construction: determined by the individual viewer’s 
narrative (where that might include her own values, memories, socio-political 
ideals), or 
 
(2) Museum-curator construction: determined by the conception as presented in 
the museum’s ‘authoritative’ narrative. 
 
Much contemporary work on ‘the experimental museum’ in the wake of Hein’s 
contributions to the philosophy of museums urges the conceptual and explanatory 
priority of the former, viewer-centered personal narratives, often culminating in the 
radical individualist constructivist claim that the meaning of the objects is personal 
in the sense of being relative to the individual’s point of view. On this construal, then, 
rather than seeing museums and their curators as authoritative in the determination 
of the meaning of the objects collected and exhibited, we should instead put the 
perspective and autobiographical narrative history of the individual viewer in the 
driving seat. While such radical individualist perspectivalism could be read into Hein 
and other contemporary works on the participatory museum, it is by no means 
mandatory, and in what follows I will sketch an alternative model to the starkly 
dichotomized contrast between discovery and projection that informs many 
discussions and debates over meaning and objectivity in philosophy of museums. 
Before doing so some clarifications are in order. 
 
My discussion so far about the meaning and interpretation of art has treated 
museum narratives as a species of communicative intentional action on a par with 
linguistic action (utterance meaning). One may question the fundamental analogy 
implicitly under consideration here between linguistic and artistic meaning on the 
grounds that museum exhibits are not necessarily “text based” works. My broad use 
of the phrase ‘intentional-communicative artefact’ to capture the status of a museum 
exhibition as authored is intended to accommodate this objection; it is compatible 
with a conception of the museum as performative, for instance.17 However in 
discussing meaning in the museum I will limit my focus to the narrative arts. This is 
not because I think other models of the museum are impossible, but because, at least 
                                            
17 See Hein, Public Art, op. cit., 111 ff.  
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within the analytic tradition, recent interventions in the philosophy of museums are 
actually informed by movements within literature and cinema.18 
 
Secondly, while much contemporary work on participatory museums prioritizes 
viewer-centered narratives over that of the curator’s vision it should be noted that 
Hein’s own model would seem to invite a “no-priority” view whereby objects inspire 
and narratives are fluid, drawing on the museum, the curators and the visitors. She 
writes in Rethinking Public Art:  
 
The monotonous voice of authority, long associated with didactic schooling 
and the conventional curator-interpreted museum, has given way to visitor-
centered museums, with options to engage the public to create meaning. 
Inviting debate, museums become sites of controversy. At the same time, 
there must be critical standards. Minimally, the museum must have defensible 
grounds for the positions it takes.19  
 
Although the emphasis placed on individual museum-goers’ experiences and 
autobiographical histories has a distinctively anti-intentionalist ring to it, one may 
wonder what is being “opposed” to what here. On the one hand, the emphasis on 
indeterminacy in Hein’s positive account (“Since its borders are indefinite, so is its 
authorship”) might seem to suggest an objection to the idea of intentional 
explanation that is already on the table with, for example, Carroll’s moderate actual 
intentionalism about art, whereby the explanation of meaning is given 
(retrospectively) by articulating the thoughts or ideas of some curator or group of 
individuals who express them as a unitary creative work (in the sense of a single item 
or a whole). On the other hand, there is also good reason for thinking that the real 
target here might not be intentional explanation of meaning as such. Indeed, in 
urging curators to advance “debate and discussion” to create “sites of controversy”, 
Hein and her followers seem to applaud the image of conversation in understanding 
our engagement with museums. So the point is perhaps not so much that there is no 
explanation forthcoming on the model of meaning in terms of intentional 
                                            
18 For a helpful overview, see Ivan Gaskell, ‘Museums and Philosophy – Of Art, and Many 
Other Things’, Parts I & II, Philosophy Compass 7/2 (2012); Part I, 74–84; Part II, 85–102. 
19 Hein, Public Art, op. cit., footnote 16, 113. Emphasis mine. 
 10 
communicative action, or even that the concept of authorship as such is inapplicable 
in the participatory museum context. The claim, it seems to me, is that we would do 
better to explain participatory museums in terms of collective action rather than as 
the expression of the intentional agency and creativity of some individual curator 
since an overly individualistic account of exhibitions and museum displays simply 
does not fit current museum practice.  
 
Whether or not the notion of individual authorship is indeed possible within the 
context of creative collective museum activity is something that I leave open here.20 
However that may be, in speaking of museums as enjoying a status as authored, I 
assume that the idea of collaboration in museum practice is at least compatible with 
the concept of joint authorship, in as much as the curator and her team are in some 
sense (legally or otherwise) responsible for the creation of the work or exhibition 
(either for an individual item or for the whole). As Paisley Livingston expresses the 
point about authorship in collaborative film-making, minimally for some artistic 
cinematic activity to count as genuinely authored, collaborators ‘must share the aim 
of contributing to the making of an utterance or work of art for which they will jointly 
take credit (and blame)’.21 I maintain that Hein’s claim that the museum as a “site of 
controversy” must have defensible grounds for the positions that it endorses 
similarly involves certain conditions on responsibility and control. 
 
But note what has happened here. Originally we tried to explain content (meaning) 
in museum narratives in terms of authorial intentions; now we are explaining the 
status of museums as expressions of intentional creative activity involving conditions 
of responsibility. I claim that there are two distinct notions of intentional explanation 
that figure in the argumentation over authorial (curator’s) intentions, which we 
should keep apart. To see this, we need to take a closer look at the concept of open-
endedness and the aforementioned conversation argument, the idea that part of the 
                                            
20 For criticism in the analogous case of collaborative film-making, see Berys Gaut, ‘Film 
Authorship and Collaboration’, in Murray Smith and Richard Allen (eds), Film Theory and 
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 149–72; and Berys Gaut, A Philosophy of 
Cinematic Art (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010), Ch. 3. 
21 Livingston, Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman, op. cit., 73–74. For further discussion of this 
topic see Livingston, Art and Intention, op. cit., Ch. 3.  
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value of our engagement with art and museums has to do with communing with 
another human being. 
 
3. Museums and the Conversation Argument 
 
As intimated in the introduction, much argumentation over objectivity in 
interpreting art often proceeds as a stark choice between two alternatives: either we 
view meaning as closed and in this sense ‘objective’ in being determined and pre-
fixed by authorial intentions (whether the actual intentions of some historical figure 
or the “implied” content from some hypothetical point of view) or we view meaning 
as open-ended and indeterminate in being fixed by audiences’ subjective meaning-
making propensities. The implicit, often unarticulated, assumption in this picture of 
meaning-content is the idea that for some item to count as meaningful (to have 
‘objective’ content) there must be a something that makes it so. Thus, for example, in 
his influential article ‘Interpretation and Objectivity’, Gregory Currie explicates the 
idea of interpretation in narrative art as a species of intentional explanation such 
that retrieval of meaning is a matter of uncovering the underlying (hidden) narrative 
intentions on behalf of the (implied) author. He writes:  
 
A point of clarification. Earlier and for the sake of a slogan, I said that 
interpretation is intentional explanation. That is not quite right. An 
interpretation tells you what is true in the story; an intentional explanation 
tells you what someone intended by writing the text of the story. We might say 
instead that an intentional explanation generates or determines an 
interpretation. The best explanation of the text tells us what the author 
intended to communicate by way of a story, and this account of what is 
intended to be true in the story determines what the story is. An intentional 
explanation has premises that jointly constitute what we might call an 
intentional hypothesis—a hypothesis about the author’s narrative intentions—
and that hypothesis is true or false, depending on whether it corresponds to 
the author’s real narrative intentions. It is really that hypothesis, constituted 
by the premises of our explanation of the relevant text tokening, that 
generates the interpretation. But the interpretation itself is neither true nor 
false; at most it is generated by an intentional hypothesis that is true, in which 
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case it is the intended interpretation.22 
 
One problem with this picture of art criticism and, by extension, conversations about 
museum exhibits, is that retrieval of meaning in the analogue case of linguistic 
understanding is typically not “hidden” from view in the way suggested by Currie’s 
use of intentional explanation as ‘intentional hypothesis’. True, speakers need not 
mean what they say. But content-meaning, the semantic significance of words, in the 
linguistic case is typically publicly displayed in the surface grammar of heard speech 
of others (as opposed to being merely a ‘hypothesis’ about their behaviour). 23 If this 
is right, there is also an important sense in which recovery of semantic content is not 
really a matter of interpretation either: while speaker-hearers may be insincere or 
otherwise conceal their minds on occasions, meaning is typically readily available in 
the expressions that competent and reasonable speakers are to understand by their 
words (as opposed to the articulation of hidden goings-on).  
 
Another issue with the present interpretation model of criticism is this. Even if 
meaning in narrative art and museum exhibitions is in fact not always or even 
typically transparent to the reader (in which case the analogical argument above 
might fail), the practice of criticism does not support the image of a stark polarized 
contrast between discovery of pre-fixed objective content (as determined by 
curatorial intentions) on the one hand, and (if recovery of such intentions is not 
possible or appropriate) subjective projection. As Frank Sibley reminds us, the reality 
of arguing about art is such that ‘we use what keys we have to the known sensitivity, 
                                            
22 Currie, ‘Interpretation and Objectivity’, op. cit., 418. 
23 Here I endorse McDowell’s “perceptual” model of the epistemology of language: ‘the 
outward aspect of linguistic behaviour is essentially content involving, so that the mind’s role 
in speech is, as it were, on the surface – part of what one presents to others [in one’s words], 
not something that is at best a hypothesis for them’. John McDowell, ‘In Defence of 
Modesty’, in John McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 100. In suggesting that recovery of semantic content is not 
a matter of interpretation I also maintain John McDowell’s endorsement of Wittgenstein’s 
publicity constraint on meaning. But I cannot argue for either of these claims here. 
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susceptibilities, and experience of our audience’.24 What we will find in those real 
cases is that criticism is more a matter of articulating significance, what makes works 
pointful, in a number of ways; sometimes simply by mentioning the salient 
considerations in question; sometimes illuminating what one sees by contrasts, 
comparisons, and reminiscence (consider cases where we get someone to see some 
pointful aspect of a work by mentioning something different).25  
 
There are two parts to this claim. First, with regard to the first alternative of the 
dichotomy, one may challenge the analogical argument for intentionalism based on 
conversation on the grounds that its appeal to the value of communicating with the 
author through the artwork (or exhibition) renders the very concept of ‘conversation’ 
inapplicable. As Kent Wilson articulates the objection, unlike the ordinary linguistic 
case, this “conversation” will in fact be a monologue since ‘the interpreter will not get 
to say what is on his mind when he interprets an artwork’.26 Andrew Huddleston 
reaches a similar conclusion. He argues that the idea of (actual) authorial intentions 
serving as a constraint on interpretation of works mitigates against the interactive 
nature of conversation per se, in which case the conversation argument for 
intentionalism would fail on its own terms. He writes: 
 
Once we require that we must take into account the intentions of our 
conversation partner if we are to have a conversation—as surely seems right—
we must be careful not to make the further step to another and more dubious 
claim: the thought that this ‘conversational’ literary interpretation is a project 
whose final hermeneutical result should be, not just informed, but 
constrained by these authorial intentions. Good conversations involve give 
and take: we see what we can make of a person’s ideas—how we can develop 
                                            
24 Frank Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, in John Benson, Betty Redfern and Jeremy Roxbee Cox 
(eds), Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics by Frank Sibley 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 18. I discuss Sibley’s position in ‘Why Sibley is Not a 
Generalist Overall’, British Journal of Aesthetics 50/1 (2010) and ‘Thick Aesthetic Concepts: 
Giving Sibley his Due’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (forthcoming). 
25 See Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, op. cit. 
26 Kent W. Wilson, ‘Confession of a Weak Anti-Intentionalist: Exposing Myself’, The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55/3 (1997), 311. 
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them, expand on them, and improve them. And to do that, we of course need 
to know what their real ideas were in the first place. But simply divining an 
interlocutor’s intentions is not the end of a good conversation; it is only the 
beginning of one.27 
 
Second, once we see meaning-content as a matter of articulating significance, that 
which makes individual works and exhibitions pointful, we can also put pressure on 
the second alternative of the dichotomy, projection. My strategy will be to defuse the 
threat to objectivity commonly associated with the idea of open-endedness and 
indeterminacy by resisting the temptation for thinking that for an item to be 
objectively meaningful there must be a something that makes it so.28 The new way of 
understanding linguistic meaning brings with it an alternative and non-reductive 
way of seeing meaning in museums (and artistic meaning more generally) in a way 
that does not follow nor support the polarized dichotomy between discovery and 
projection with which we started.  
 
4. Semantic Particularism and Open-endedness 
 
The position defended here, which I call semantic particularism,29 maintains that 
meaning is an essentially intentional phenomenon, in as much as meaning is 
fundamentally to be explained in terms of intentional action among competent 
speaker-hearers within norm-governed linguistic practice in a way that is answerable 
to how things are.  
 
Charles Travis is adamant that intentions cannot play the role of determining what 
is said by an utterance, and instead appeals to Wittgensteinian considerations about 
                                            
27 Huddleston, ‘The Conversation Argument for Actual Intentionalism’, op. cit., 242. 
28 For detailed discussion of this topic in Wittgenstein, the conception, the picture, of 
meaning-content as an underlying hidden ingredient, see Garry Hagberg’s contribution to 
this volume. 
29 See Anna Bergqvist, ‘Semantic Particularism and Linguistic Competence’, Logique et 
Analyse 52/208 (2009), 343–361. This position is also defended in Anna Bergqvist, 
Understanding Moral Situations: An Essay in Particularist Epistemology, PhD Thesis, 
University of Reading 2009. 
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rule-following and judgements formed from within a shared linguistic practice. Thus, 
for example, in commenting on McDowell’s construal on the publicity constraint on 
the epistemology of understanding, Travis writes, 
 
intentions cannot play that role [of determining what someone has 
said,] … a statement’s content is fixed by what one might have 
reasonably be[en] expected to do with it, given where and how it 
occurred. Whatever a speaker’s belief, intentions, and so on, might 
suggest might thus be cancelled out by the way his words fit into our 
lives. That is another correct take on the idea that words are not 
animated by hidden goings-on.30 
 
As I read him, Travis is here not objecting to the psychological, as such, as irrelevant 
in explanations of how and where words gets their semantic life.31 The claim, rather, 
is that linguistic acts do not inherit their content from the intentions with which they 
are made. Or at least, this is the position of the semantic particularism that I defend. 
How should we understand this? The first thing to note is that we here have the 
beginning of a formulation of the idea that the epistemology of language concerns 
something normative, namely, what it would be reasonable for a competent speaker 
to understand by uses of some expression given the practical shape of the 
circumstances at hand. Hang onto that thought; we will return to it below in 
connection with the work of a museum curator. What we are presently interested in 
is the role of speakers’ intentions in the resulting account. Let us take a closer look at 
Grice’s view. 
 
According to a Gricean theory of meaning and communication, when I use a given 
linguistic expression of a natural language vocabulary to say or state something, I 
intend to bring it about that my intended audience forms a certain belief about the 
                                            
30 Charles Travis, ‘Taking Thought’, Mind 109/435 (2000), 553. 
31 Travis’s overt suspicion of ‘a speaker’s belief, intentions, and so on’ has its own discursive 
context that forms part a long-standing critique of Grice’s theory of meaning and 
communication. The Gricean view has also been criticized by John McDowell in his 
‘Meaning, Communication, and Knowledge’, in John McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge, and 
Reality, op. cit., 29–50. 
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very intention that I have in producing the speech-act in question: the belief that I 
aim to communicate. (Or at least, I try to make my hearers form such beliefs about 
what my intentions or beliefs are.) For our purposes, the important point is this: on a 
Gricean view of conversation, belief and expectations about speakers’ intentions is all 
there is to meaning (except for what Grice calls ‘natural meaning’, which is reserved 
for causal relations of indication such as clouds meaning rain and spots meaning 
stress). But this does not mean that there is no such thing as the meaning of a 
sentence in a language.32 On a Gricean theory of (non-natural) meaning, the lexical 
meaning of a sentence is the very same thing as what speakers standardly mean by 
it, that is, the belief speakers standardly intend to cause their hearer to recognise as 
the belief intentionally communicated by their assertoric use of the sentence in 
question. Note, by the way, that one might try to invoke this suggestion as an 
explanation of “what makes it the case” that a competent speaker’s reasonable 
expectation of what thought is expressed by the use of some sentence is, in general, 
the right one. That is to say, one might hope to shoehorn objectivity into the 
semantic discourse concerning the normative facts that the semantic particularist is 
interested in by appeal to some statistical conventional standard concerning what 
speakers’ intentions are standardly expressed by assertoric uses of the sentence.33  
 
On a Gricean model of meaning and communication, content is thus ultimately 
determined by the beliefs speakers have and intend to communicate to others. I 
think this sounds wrong. For what speakers mean by a declarative sentence in 
everyday communication is, typically, that something is thus and so. As far as I can 
tell, this ‘something’ is not typically the fact that the speaker in question has a certain 
                                            
32 Particular sentences may be open to interpretation, in as much as it may not always be 
clear what belief or thought the speaker aims to communicate/cause his audience to have; 
but the lexical literal meaning of the sentence used is fixed by what speakers standardly 
intend their audience to believe, as per above. 
33 For discussion and defence of broadly Gricean theories of speakers’ intentions in 
connection to the issue of objectivity in semantic discourse, see A. Barber, ‘Truth-Conditions 
and their Recognition’, in A. Barber (ed), The Epistemology of Language (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 367–395. 
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belief about the things talked about.34 There are various formulations of the exact 
structure of the belief-forming procedure from speaker to hearer, but all are rooted 
in the suggestion that communication is a matter of a speaker intentionally trying to 
make his hearers recognize that a certain belief (that is, the belief that p) is the belief 
that the speaker intends them to have. However, the same suspicion arises at the 
level of intentions: the Gricean picture fails to accommodate the prima facie 
plausible suggestion that taking someone at her word in communication is a matter 
of appreciating just what the speaker is saying, by way of producing significant 
linguistic acts intentionally.35 
 
This is not a play with words. It is one thing to claim that one can form a certain 
belief, call it the ‘belief that p’, that somehow bears on the topic of the conversation in 
understanding what is said by literal uses of expressions in a language. It is quite 
another thing to say that speakers typically use declarative sentences with a view to 
getting their intended audiences to recognize that they intend their hearers to come 
to believe that p. As before, there are cases that might fit the Gricean suggestion. For 
example, if I am being interrogated by the police after having robbed a bank, and 
know that the police suspect, falsely, that I am innocent and that I am deliberately 
covering or taking the blame for somebody else, I can exploit this knowledge by 
saying, truly, ‘It was me who did it’. The idea would be that I say something I 
“believe” to be true, namely that it was me who robbed the bank, with the intention 
of bringing it about that the interrogator recognizes that I want him to believe that I 
robbed the bank (that it was me who did it) so that the person the police suspect 
                                            
34 Of course, I can want to impart information about the beliefs that I have in speaking with 
others. For example, if I wake up one morning finding myself believing that green men from 
planet Chaos are hiding under the bed I would do well if I tried to impart the information 
that I have such beliefs to a medical doctor. Still, this does not seem to resemble the standard 
case of everyday linguistic exchanges between speaker-hearers of a shared natural language. 
35 For discussion of this point in relation to authorial intentionalism about art interpretation, 
see, for example, Wilson, ‘Confessions of a Weak Anti-Intentionalist’, op. cit. 
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really did it gets away with the crime.36 (These sorts of cases are commonly known as 
‘anti-lying’ in the literature.)  
 
Although communicative exchanges between speakers at the ground level of 
linguistic practice can no doubt involve substantial inferential transitions between 
judgements about speakers’ intentions like the ‘anti-lying’ case described above, I 
hold that we need an independent argument to show that semantic content is a 
function of speakers’ intentions in the Gricean sense.  
 
I have not offered any arguments for the claim that non-reductive normativism is 
correct in the domain of linguistic meaning. Instead I have sought to motivate the 
view by showing that the appeal to authorial intentions to defend objectivity in 
interpretation is based on a misconception of available positions in conceptual space. 
But what is the analogous conception of meaning in museum narratives (and artistic 
meaning more generally) that this new way of seeing the matter of meaning brings 
with it? 
 
5. Concept and Conceptions 
 
A museum narrative frames the objects on display, where the framing is a result of 
selection, prioritization and organization not only on behalf of the curator but also 
the participating viewer. It is however a mistake to think that radical subjectivity is 
entailed by the fact of different narratives because these are conceptions of the object 
of inquiry, not the object itself. There is no implication, or so I claim, for the meaning 
or nature of the object on display in the museum based on the fact of different 
narratives. 
 
One is easily led to suspicion of narrative explanation as a genuine form of 
explanation by exaggerating the role of interpretation. Taking a leaf from Peter 
Goldie’s work on historical and autobiographical narratives, part of the problem is 
that the suspicion that putative supporting documents for any such particular 
                                            
36 I owe this example to Barber’s discussion of anti-lying in connection to Gricean intention-
based theories of meaning. See Barber, ‘Truth-Conditions and their Recognition’, op. cit., 
376. 
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narrative are ‘just more text, multiply open to interpretation’ motivates the 
assimilation of narratives and what they are about.37 Transposed to the present case, 
the exaggeration about interpretation is the simple point that all these salient 
features pointed to in making good some particular museum narrative are 
themselves open to radically open-ended interpretation in line with the individual 
viewer’s experience and, or so a constructivist argument would continue, “meaning-
making” propensities.  
 
I maintain that this way of thinking mis-locates the role of context in museum 
practice. The meaning is not to be found in the narrative, whether in terms of some 
‘authoritative’ curator’s construction or the individual viewer perspective. The 
narrative can reveal (or conceal) the object’s meaning – but it does not determine the 
object’s meaning. To think otherwise would be a failure of running together what is 
represented with the representation.  
 
Why does the temptation exist? There are all sorts of reasons for thinking that there 
must be perspectival facts, but the consideration that I will focus on in what follows 
connects with the Wittgensteinian critique of the atomistic, picture-driven Russellian 
model of meaning discussed in Garry Hagberg’s contribution to this volume.38 
 
The idea of narrative as revelatory of meaning can be brought into sharper focus by 
comparison with Wittgenstein’s idea of a ‘perspicuous representation’ as being a key 
aspect of the task of philosophy as he sees it: offering a model of comparison that 
‘earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things’ in order to achieve 
a ‘clear view’ of that which is troubling us.39 However this does not mean that there is 
some single philosophical method through which this is achieved. On the contrary, 
Wittgenstein presents the philosopher with an open-ended range of conceptual tools 
and techniques that can be used in a variety of different ways including (but not 
limited to): offering ‘objects of comparison’ and presenting ‘alternative pictures’; 
pointing out particular ‘family resemblances’ and ‘neglected aspects’ of our language; 
                                            
37 Peter Goldie, The Mess Inside (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 153–154. 
38 See Garry Hagberg, ‘Word and Object: Museums and the Question of Meaning’ in this 
volume. 
39 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations XXX, §122 and §133. 
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grammatical analysis of our use of language in practice, and so on. The real task at 
hand is to discern which method available to one is the most pointful in each context 
of critical appraisal for attaining clarity and reveal meaning – to which “whatever it 
takes” would be the only answer to give in the abstract.  
 
The meaning of the notion a ‘perspicuous representation’ is controversial within 
Wittgenstein scholarship. One view is that that perspicuous representations are 
independent of any particular point of view.40 On this model, the notion of a 
perspicuous representation is not to be understood as a way of seeing things and 
there cannot be multiple perspicuous ways of seeing the rules of ‘our grammar’; any 
difference we might perceive between multiple perspicuous representations of an 
area of our grammar is merely a difference in how they are selected and arranged, 
something that can vary depending on the purpose of the investigation. However, 
just as a cartographer might combine maps of Buda and Pest in order to produce a 
map of Budapest, so the philosopher can combine a series of related perspicuous 
representations to produce a more comprehensive whole. (In this respect, orthodox 
readers see perspicuous representations as ‘additive’, in as much as we can combine 
multiple perspicuous representations of a thing’s parts in order to gain a perspicuous 
representation of the whole.) Whether or not this is the best representation of 
Wittgenstein’s position falls beyond the scope of my current argument. At any rate, I 
am inclined to agree with Gregory Currie (who in turn follows John McDowell) that a 
representation (as used in ordinary contexts) that transcends any point of view 
seems incoherent.41  
 
To make good my initial claim that the general idea of open-endedness and 
indeterminacy is nonetheless compatible with the idea of objectivity we may follow 
the basic tactic of Adrian Moore’s defence of ‘absolute representations’, 
representations that can be added without danger of conflicting points of view, and 
distinguish between the conditions of the production of a representation on the one 
                                            
40 See Rupert Read and Phil Hutchinson, ‘Toward a Perspicuous Presentation of 
“Perspicuous Presentation’, Philosophical Investigations 31/2 (2008), 141–160, see 
especially 151. 
41 Currie, ‘Interpretation and Objectivity’, op. cit. See also Gordon Baker, Wittgenstein’s 
Method: Neglected Aspects (London: Blackwell, 2006), especially chapters 12 and 13. 
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hand and ‘the role that the representation can play in such process as indirect 
integration’ on the other.42 What is interesting about Moore’s account for present 
purposes is his argument that the perspectivalness of the production of a 
representation, expressive of an answerable stance upon the world that (at least in 
the evaluative case) includes the history of whatever conceptual apparatus that is 
used in it, has no effect on the stance-independence of the latter. He writes: 
 
One attractive feature of this tactic is that it leaves considerable room for 
concession whenever anyone insists on the parochial, conditioned, nay, 
perspectival character of any act of producing a representation. They are right 
to insist on this, if it is properly understood. Apart from anything else, any act 
of producing a representation in an act, and agency itself is impossible 
without some (evaluative) point of view giving sense to the question of what to 
do. But one possible thing to do is to represent the world from no point of 
view.43 
 
Just how we should best understand the relation of the parochial – which lies at the 
heart of my non-reductive conception of meaning – to that of an absolute conception 
of the world is something that I leave open for future work. The claim here is simply 
that the “producer” of an evaluative representation has a point of view operative in 
producing it; the context of the agent betrays a stance upon the world. Whether or 
not it is impossible to exercise the concept – a representation – of a representation 
“from no point of view” in Moore’s sense is another matter. 
 
Now, in terms of how what we may think of as Wittgenstein’s method(s) looks in 
practice, one is reminded of Frank Sibley’s notion of “perceptual proof” in aesthetic 
evaluation: (1) the ways in which, by various means, we can enable someone else to 
see for himself that a work is good; or (2) with the giving to someone of reasons that, 
if he accepts our statements, must admit that a work must be good, though he cannot 
see that it is for himself; or (3) with the person who finds a work good and later looks 
                                            
42 Moore, Points of View, op. cit., 89. 
43Ibid. 
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for the reasons why it is, in order to justify his initial judgement.44 The focus of 
Sibley’s discussion is Michael Scriven’s scepticism about what he calls the 
‘independence requirement’ on aesthetic evaluation. The independence requirement 
is a demand on rational (aesthetic) thought that ‘we must be able to know the reason 
or reasons for a conclusion without first having to know the conclusion; otherwise we 
can never get the reason as a means to the conclusion’.45 In its strongest form, the 
independence requirement demands that reasons must be logically prior to aesthetic 
verdicts (as opposed to temporally prior in perception).  
 
Like Wittgenstein before him, Sibley does not attempt a refutation of the sceptic by 
way of showing the independence requirement could be met. Instead he effectively 
uses the strategy of offering a ‘perspicuous representation’ of art criticism by 
pointing to the way it is actually practiced to show that aesthetic evaluations stand in 
no need for external validation.  
 
How a critic manages by what he says and does to bring people to see aesthetic 
qualities they have missed has frequently puzzled writers. But there is no real 
reason for mystification. … What mainly is required is a detailed description of 
the sorts of thing critics in fact do and say, for this is what succeeds if anything 
does; the critic may make similes and comparisons, describe the work in 
appropriate metaphors, gesticulate aptly and so on. Almost anything he may do, 
verbal or non-verbal, can on occasion prove successful. To go on to ask how these 
methods can possibly succeed is to begin to ask how people can ever be brought 
to see aesthetic (and Gestalt and other similar) properties at all.46 
 
Thus, for Sibley and Wittgenstein, there is no one method of how we ought to do 
philosophy, but rather we employ a range of different tools that fit the task at hand; 
                                            
44 See Frank Sibley, ‘General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics’, in Benson, Redfern and 
Roxbee Cox (eds), Approach to Aesthetics, op. cit., 116. Sibley first introduced the notion of a 
‘perceptual proof’ in his seminal article, ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, op. cit.  
45 Mark Scriven, Primary Philosophy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966). Quoted in Sibley, 
‘General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics’, op. cit., 115. 
46 Frank Sibley, ‘Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic’, in Benson, Redfern and Roxbee Cox (eds), 
Approach to Aesthetics, op. cit., 38. 
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whatever it takes. With this in mind, let us return to the problem with the idea of 
museums framing reality.  
 
6. The Museum as a Model of Comparison 
 
The passage from Baxandall that I quoted above in introducing the emphasis placed 
on construction and individual viewer narrative contexts above effectively declares 
content-involving (and so rationality-involving) phenomena in human life to be 
inseparable from point or purpose. But nothing in that bare thought precludes the 
alternative understanding of perspective and the significance of context where 
content and human-involving interests or purposes are seen as interdependent, such 
that neither can be understood except in connection with the other. 
 
The individualist constructivist model of “meaning-making” by contrast, opens the 
door to something more: to the prospect that we can see content as determined by 
independently specifiable viewer-centred narratives, patterns of attention, or on a 
larger scale, generic socio-political cultural narratives that are discernible in public 
discourse. In so far as the promises of the ‘new museum’ lies in such a reduction of 
meaning to a perspective, it is a new paradigm I think we should resist.  
 
Instead I suggest that we may think of a museum narrative as a model of 
comparison, deployed in the interests of uncovering meaning in a way that is 
perhaps analogous to the very activity of philosophy itself. Maybe the question of 
what exactly is to be understood in a museum exhibit is itself an ill-posed question, 
and that it is this ‘dislodging’ of ideas that the new museum forms endeavours to 
illuminate. If we may think of the participatory museum as taking on this task (as 
Wittgenstein does with philosophy), we can also preserve a critical perspective in 
favour of a purely sociological or autobiographical one.47 Such reorientation of focus 
                                            
47 This paragraph was inspired by recent unpublished work on Wittgenstein and 
contextualism by Jason Bridges and by Avner Baz’s work on aspect seeing. See, for example, 
Avner Baz, ‘What's the Point of Seeing Aspects?’, Philosophical Investigations 23/2 (2000), 
97–122); and Avner Baz, ‘Aspects Perception and Philosophical Difficulty’, in Oskaari 
Kuusela and Marie McGinn (eds), Handbook on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Oxford 
University Press), XXX. 
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makes available a distinctive mode of criticism, in which claims to ‘objective’ 
meaning in museum narratives are criticized not as false per se, but as failing to yield 
the insight about the problem of objective meaning in museums practice it was the 
point of those claims to provide. The alternative strategy is rather to defuse the threat 
to objectivity commonly associated with the idea of open-endedness and 
indeterminacy by resisting the temptation for thinking that for an item to be 
objectively meaningful there must be a something that makes it so (be it curatorial 
intentions or the individual reader’s point of view). 
 
Thinking of a museum narrative as a model of comparison offers an alternative 
conception of an object as exhibited. We might think that the object is absolute, and 
the conceptions of it are perspectival, and stance-dependent. What this means is that 
the route to truth will be stance-dependent, shaped by your conceptions. 
Nonetheless, locutions such as ‘X is objective’ are yet legitimate, in as much as there 
are better or worse ways of conceiving of X. This preserves a critical stance in 
museums practice, in as much as we are now in a position to hold that the meaning 
of the objects on display cannot be accessed except through a perspective, and yet 
think of competing narratives (either personal or, on a larger scale, world-view 
models of comparison) as offering different perspectives on the object of inquiry – 
without reducing meaning and truth to a perspective.  
 
I conclude with some remarks about the wider significance of the present picture in 
elucidating the use of concepts such as value and perspective more generally.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
Like photographic images, museums establish specific contexts, framings, bounded 
horizons of legible selectivity that distinguish them from viewing the world face-to-
face. What I have suggested here is that we may think of an exhibition and its 
museum objects (as already framed in the museum) as instantiations of a particular 
model of comparison, which can act as a site for reinforcement and re-examination 
of the stances of its viewers.  
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In the context of moral philosophy, Maximilian De Gaynesford argues that reference 
to the first person – first personal thought – in ethical thinking is of greatest 
importance in understanding the very notions of ‘rational agency’ (agency that 
involves responsiveness to reasons) and ‘practical reasoning’ (reasoning leading to 
action). As he puts it, ‘[u]nless some situation is mine, I am unable to recognise it as 
open to my agency or as relating me to various reason-giving facts. And unless some 
reasons are mine, I am unable to engage in reasoning that leads to action’.48 
Similarly, in the aesthetic context, we may ask what makes it the case that some 
reason or wider curatorial context of the museum is a situation of mine? What is the 
relation of agency that discloses objects on display as ‘open’ to me as a responsible 
critic or art practitioner?  
 
I claim that we may speak of narrative structure in certain museum exhibits as 
making reasons available to the agent, where the concept of ‘narrative’ is to be 
understood as something fundamentally perspectival. I use this noncommittal 
formulation deliberately in order to avoid more theoretically loaded models of the 
relationship between the normative content of ethics and practical agency, and the 
general notion of deliberating ‘from a perspective’. A familiar representative 
theoretical model of the relation between the moral agent and ethical values uses the 
idea of agent-relative reasons for action, where the notion of the ‘agent-relative’ is 
invoked to bring out a tacit relativity to the agent’s personal point of view in the 
content of a particular class of reasons or values within non-perspectival moral 
reasons or values.49 This is a standard way of understanding the idea that a reason 
stands in a special constitutive relation to a particular agent (or class thereof). The 
central idea is to establish a contrast between that which is ethically relevant when 
viewed impartially and that which is ethically relevant from a particular personal 
perspective: impartial or agent-neutral reasons ‘constitute the background against 
                                            
48 Maximilian de Gaynesford, ‘The Bishop, the Chambermaid, the Wife and the Ass: What 
Difference Does it Make if Something is Mine?’, in J. Cottingham, P. Stratton-Lake and B. 
Feltham (eds), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Obligations and the Wider 
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 91. 
49 Alan Thomas, ‘Reasonable Partiality and the Personal Point of View’, Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice 8 (2005), 32. 
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which we are to ask whether there are any other reasons other than these’.50 
However, understanding point of view as a determinant of a special class of agent-
relative reasons or values contrasted with another class of values or reasons 
determined by the impartial perspective is entirely optional and not something that I 
am advocating here. Instead, we may think of think of point of view in museum 
narratives as an agent’s standpoint on independent reality, where my concept of 
narrative structure identifies something that makes value available to an agent’s 
judgement in conversation with others rather than a determinant of value itself. The 
new image of meaning-content as a matter of articulating significance reminds us 
that conversations about art and museum exhibits concern the on-going dialogue 
pertaining to what makes objects on display pointful, in ways that do not readily 
support the stark polarized contrast between discovery and projection with which we 
started. Herein lies a value of museum narratives (exhibitions) – they offer us 
opportunities for reflection on the way that we see the world by presenting particular 
points of view in showing and being shown the world a certain way.51 
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